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CORPORATIONS DON'T KILL PEOPLE - PEOPLE DO:
EXPLORING THE GOALS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM'S
CORPORATE HOMICIDE BILL
A corporation is an abstraction. It is incapable itself of
doing any physical act or being in any state of mind.
-Lord
I.

Diplock'

INTRODUCTION

A corporation is a creature of law, acting as a fictional entity in the
eyes of the law. 2 However, a corporation is made up of and run by
people, acting as agents of the corporation. 3 These peoples' actions
can be criminal in nature and result in death. Consequently, criminal
prosecutors seek to punish someone or something for homicide.
The capsized Zeebrugge ferry, the King's Cross fire, the Clapham
and Paddington Rail crashes, the "Bowtelle"-"Marchioness" boat collision, and the Hillsborough football tragedy all represent recent disasters in which the United Kingdom's Director of Public Prosecutions
either decided not to prosecute or failed to successfully prosecute the
corporations or organizations responsible for many deaths. 4 These recent events5 inspired the United Kingdom to propose the Corporate
1. R. v. P & 0 European Ferries, Ltd., 93 Cr. App. R. 72, 82 (1990) (quoting Lord
Diplock's speech). The court further quoted from Diplock's speech:
Yet in law it is a person capable of exercising legal rights and of being subject to legal liabilities which may involve ascribing to it not only physical acts
which are in reality done by a natural person on its behalf but also the
mental state in which that person did them.
2. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS,
100 (8h ed. 2000).
3. Stanley S. Arkin, Corporate Guilty Plea, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 10, 1985, at 1.
4. See discussion infra Part III.
5.
See generally Jean Eaglesham, Making an Offense Out of a Disaster: Plans to Make
Directors Criminally Liable for Deaths Caused by Negligence Could Have Far Reaching Effects,
FIN. TIMES, Jun. 18, 2001, at 13; Ben Webster, PaddingtonCrashFamilies to Fightfor Prosecution, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2001, at 12; Andrew Edgar, Corporate Manslaughter is Just
Around the Corner, 12 INT'L Co. & COMM'L L. REV. 117 (2001); Michael Jefferson, Recent
Developments in Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 16 Co. LAWYER 146 (1995); Richard J.
McGrane & Ian M. Gault, Corporate Manslaughter in Major Disasters, 2 INT'L Co. &
COMM'L L. REV. 166 (1991); CorporateManslaughter: Back on the Cards, 22 Co. LAWYER 1
(2001).
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Homicide Bill; a statute that, if passed, would make the corporate entity criminally liable for deaths that occur as a result of "management
failure." 6 This Note argues that the Corporate Homicide Bill will not
deter corporate actions that result in death.
Section 1 of the Corporate Homicide Bill applies to the corporate
entity and allows a court to issue a fine as punishment. 7 A better way to
deter homicide is to convict and imprison corporate functionaries in a
personal capacity. Section 2 of the Corporate Homicide Bill applies to
corporate officers in a personal capacity;8 however, §5 of the Bill de6.

Corporate Homicide Act, 2000, at §1 (Eng.) [hereinafter Corporate Homicide

Act].
7. Id. Section 1, in relevant part, reads as follows:
Corporate Killing
1. (1) A corporation is guilty of corporate killing if(a) a management failure is the cause or one of the causes of a
persons death; and
(b) that failure constitutes conduct falling far below what can reasonably be expected of the corporation in the circumstances.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) above(a) there is a management failure by a corporation if the way in
which its activities are managed or organi[z]ed fails to ensure
the health and safety of persons employed in or affected by
those activities; and
(b) such a failure may be regarded as a cause of a person's death
notwithstanding that the immediate cause is the act or omission of an individual.
(3) A corporation guilty of an offense under this section is liable on
conviction on indictment for a fine.
8. Id. at §2. Section 2, in relevant part, reads as follows:
Corporate Killing
1. (1) An officer of a corporation is guilty of corporate killing if(a) a management failure is the cause or one of the causes of a
persons death; and
(b) that failure constitutes conduct falling far below what can reasonably be expected of the corporation in the circumstances.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) above(a) there is a management failure by a corporation if the way in
which its activities are managed or organized fails to ensure the
health and safety of persons employed in or affected by those
activities; and
(b) such a failure may be regarded as a cause of a person's death
notwithstanding that the immediate cause is the act or omission of an individual.
(3) A corporation guilty of an offense under this section is liable on
conviction on indictment to a fine or imprisonment or both.
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fines "officer" narrowly, 9 excluding from liability other corporate functionaries who may be associated with the homicide. The House of
Commons should reform the Corporate Homicide Bill to exclude §1
and expand the definition of "officer" in §5 to include corporate functionaries associated with the homicide.
Part II of this note outlines various justifications and aspirations of
criminal justice and punishment, discusses agency and the corporate
form, and explores the history of corporate criminal liability in the
United Kingdom. Part III uses recent events to illustrate that corporate fining is replacing individual imprisonment for corporate-related
homicide in the United Kingdom, and demonstrates that the Corporate Homicide Bill will not effectively deter corporate-related homicide. Part IV argues that courts should imprison corporate
functionaries associated with the homicide rather than fine the corporate entity for homicide. It also advocates reformation of the Corporate Homicide Bill to exclude corporate liability and expand the scope
of personal liability. This note concludes in Part V that personal imprisonment of corporate functionaries associated with the homicide
can deter homicide more effectively than corporate fines.
II.

A.

BACKGROUND

Aspirations and Justifications of CriminalJustice and Punishment

All crimes, with the exception of strict liability crimes, require an
act or omission (actus reus) and a culpable mental state (mens rea). lo
Society and the criminal justice system seek to punish the culpable
mental states and acts underlying crimes.'1
Throughout history, society has justified punishment in many different ways. 12 Although modern society views the gruesome methods
of punishment previously employed, in medieval times for example, as
"cruel and unusual,"' 3 the concept of "an eye for an eye" has long en.
9. Id. at §5. Section 5 defines "officer" as "the chairman, maniaging director
chief executive or secretary of a corporation."
10.

Rebecca Dresser, Culpd)ility and Other Minds, 2 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY

41, 85 (1993).
GEORGE Dix & M. MIGcIAEL SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS
11.
ed. 1996).
12. See generally Catherine Scharf, The Philosophy of Punishment: Does Punishmer
ter Crime and Keep Society Safe? (Winter 2000), available at http://www.publicrelaf
villanova. edu/magazine/Summer%202000/Punishment-htm.
13.
Id. at para. 3.
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dured in the criminal justice system 14 and closely resembles what is
15
known as retribution.
Advocates of retribution argue that society should intentionally inflict pain and suffering on a criminal to the extent he deserves because
he willingly committed a crime. 16 However, not all legal philosophers
agree with such means and justification for punishment. 17 Critics of
retribution view punishment as something more than mere vengeance
toward the criminal in response to his misconduct.1 8
Another justification for punishment is rehabilitation. 19 Rehabilitation aims to alter a criminal offender's behavior so that he or she no
21
longer violates laws.2" Thus, rehabilitation serves a utilitarian end; it
seeks to do the greatest good for the greatest number by reforming a
22
criminal, thereby reducing the number of criminals in society.
Those who oppose rehabilitation characterize it as impossible or
immoral.23
A third justification for punishment, deterrence, also serves a utilitarian end; 2 4 it helps cure the sociological problem of criminal behavior, but it does not seek to punish by hurting or rehabilitating an
individual. 2 5 Instead, deterrence aims to dissuade the offender and
other possible offenders from committing future crimes. 26 Deterrence
can be split into two categories: specific and general. Specific deterrence is the pressure that memories of incarceration place on a released convict, causing him or her to obey the law.2 7 General
deterrence is the pressure that a convict's pain and suffering exerts on
28
potential criminals, causing them to obey the law.
14.
Id. at para. 5.
Id.
15.
16. Robert Blecker, Haven orHell? Inside Lorton CentralPrison:Experiences ofPunishmentJustified, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1149, 1150 (1990).
17.
See id.; JACK P. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND DETERRENCE 82-3 (1975).
18. GIBBS, supra note 17.
19. See id.; see also Blecker, supra note 16; Scharf, supra note 12.
20. GIBBS, supra note 17, at 72.
21.
Scharf, supra note 12, at para. 6.
22. Id.
23. Blecker, supra note 16.
24. Scharf, supra note 12.
25. Id.
26. See id.; see also Blecker, supra note 16; GIBBS, supra note 17.
27. Blecker, supra note 16.
28. id.
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Most theories of corporate punishment primarily rely on deterrence as ajustification. 29 The United Kingdom's Corporate Homicide
Bill embodies such a theory, aiming to deter management failure that
30
results in death.
B.

Agency and the CorporateForm

The corporate form dates back as far as the thirteenth century.-"
The earliest corporations were ecclesiastical entities that managed
church property.3 2 Later, municipalities and governmental bodies began to take advantage of the corporate form, 33 and the government
incorporated organizations such as hospitals and universities. 34 The
government incorporated early trades based on whether they provided
the community with basic necessities. 35 Henry II chartered the earliest
trade organizations, the weavers.3 6 During the 1 4 th and 1 5 th Centuries,
fishmongers, vintners, and
the goldsmiths, mercers, haberdashers,
3 7
merchant tailors were incorporated.
To form a corporation today, one must file formal statements with
a governmental body announcing his or her intention to incorporate.3' 8 The corporation then achieves entity status: The newly formed
corporation has become a legally separate being through the operation of the law. 39 The corporation exists separately from its incorporator(s) existence; 40 it is, so to speak, a fictional person. 4 1 It can exercise
See BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME, AND ACCOUNTrA(1993).
See generally Corporate Homicide Act 2000; Celia Wells, The Law Commission
30.
Report on Involuntary Manslaughter: The CorporateManslaughterProposals:Pragmatism, Paradox, and Peninsularity, CRIM. L. REv. 545 (Aug. 1996); Bob Sullivan, Corporate Killing Some Government Proposals, CRIM. L. REV. 31-39 (Jan. 2001).
31.
Arkin, supra note 3.
32. LARRY D. SODERQUIST, ET.AL., CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS ( 5 th ed. 2001).
33. Id.
34. W.S. Holdsworth, English CorporationLaw in the 16' and 1 7 h Centuries, 31 YALE
L.J. 382, 382 (1922).
35. Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business CorporationsBefore 1800, 2 HARV.
L. REv. 105, 108-09 (1888).
36. Id.
37. Id.
29.

BILITY

38.

EISENBURG, supra note 2, at 107.

39.
40.
41.

Id. at 100.
Id.
Id.
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rights and have power in its own name; it can sue and be sued; it can
hold property; and it must pay taxes. 4 2 Can it commit a crime?
Because corporations are separate legal entities run entirely by
people, they are governed largely by the principles of agency law. 4 3 An
agent is someone who acts on behalf of a principal 44 - the corporation.
45
A principal controls an agent.
When the corporation causes harm, problems arise as to whether
46
liability should rest with the corporation as a whole or with its agents.
Corporations are organized to limit managers', directors', and officers'
liability, rendering only the corporation as a whole liable for any harm
it causes. 47 This is especially problematic when the harm can be characterized as criminal, because criminal law is primarily focused on a
48
person's action and mental state, not those of a corporate entity.
Therefore, punishing a corporation undermines the theoretical foundations of criminal law, which presuppose that crimes involve an act
and a culpable mental state. 4 9 Furthermore, crime is necessarily an
ultra vires50 act of a corporation; liability cannot be imputed to it because one cannot legally form a corporation for purposes of commit51
ting crime.
C.

The History of Corporate Criminal Liability in England

Legal scholars historically advanced the position that a corporation could not be punished. 52 In 1250, Pope Innocent IV stated that a
corporation could not be excommunicated because it did not have a
soul. 53 Later, Edward, first Baron Turlow, expanded upon Innocent's
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
(1969).
49.
50.

Id.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 100.
Id.
L.H. LEIGH,

THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS IN ENGLISH LAW 3-4

See Dresser, supra note 10.
Ultra vires is defined as being in excess of the powers of a corporation. STEVEN

H. GIFIs, DICTIONARY OF LEGAL TERMS: A SIMPLIFIED GUIDE TO THE LANGUAGE OF LAW 514

(3d. ed. 1998).
51.

LEIGH, supra note 48, at 3.

52.
53.

Arkin, supra note 3, at 28.
Id.
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position in his highly quoted statement that a corporation has "no soul
54
to be damned and no body to be kicked."
Early English courts did not recognize corporate criminal liability.55 In 1612, the King's Bench stated corporations could not commit
crimes. 56 In 1701, Chief Justice Holt held that "a corporation is not
57
indictable, but the particular members of it are."
However, courts later began to hold corporations liable for certain
crimes. 58 In 1842, a corporation did not obey a court order to build a
bridge, and the Queens Bench held the it liable 5 9 for nonfeasance, 60
which equates to what is now known as criminal contempt of court. In
1846, a corporation created a nuisance by building a bridge that interfered with a highway, and the Queen's Bench held the corporation
62
6
criminally liable ' for malfeasance.
Industries and corporations became widespread forms of business
during the late 1800s, and corporate criminal law evolved to accommodate theories of corporate liability. 6 3 In 1866, the Queen's Bench held
a quarry company liable for criminal nuisance when employees threw
stone into a river that hindered navigation. 64 The court adopted a vicarious liability theory from tort law65 to find corporations criminally
liable for employee misconduct within the scope of employment. 6 6

54. Id.
55. See Anonymous, 88 Eng. Rep. 1518 (K.B. 1701); In Re Sutton's Hospital, 77
Eng. Rep. 937 (K.B. 1612).
56. Id. at 973. This was a civil case concerning whether a hospital had entity status
as a corporation. However, the court outlined, in dicta, certain actions that a corporation could and could not theoretically perform.
57. Anonymous, 88 Eng. Rep. at 1518. This quote represents Holt's opinion in its
entirety.
58. See Queen v. Birmingham & Gloucester Ry., 3 Q.B. 223 (1842); Queen v. Great
N. of Eng. Ry., 9 Q.B. 315 (1846).
59.
Nonfeasance is defined as the omission to perform a required duty. GIFTS,
supra note 50, at 322.
60. Birmingham & Gloucester Ry., 3 Q.B. at 233.
61.
Great N. of Eng. Ry., 9 Q.B. at 326.
62. Malfeasance is defined as a wrongful act, which the actor has no legal right to
do. GIFIS, supra note 50, at 287.
63. Arkin, supra note 3, at 28.
64. See Queen v. Stephens, 1 L.R. 702 (Q.B. 1866).
65.
Id.
66.
GIFIs, supra note 50, at 527.
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Vicarious liability became a dominant theory in prosecuting corporations throughout the late 1800s and early 1900s. 67 Most cases involved minor statutory offenses, which Parliament intended to be strict
liability offenses; the master (corporation) was strictly liable for the servant's (employee's) criminal conduct. 68 However, corporations still
could not possess the intent required for crimes involving death or
personal violence; 69 at that time, corporations had only been convicted of crimes involving negligence or strict liability.
The "directing mind" theory, which developed throughout the
1900s, provided a way for prosecutors to indict and convict corpora7
tions for crimes outside the scope of negligence and strict liability. 0
Lord Denning, in 1956, outlined the directing mind theory, which suggested that the guilty mind of directors or managers could make a
company guilty of crimes requiring a guilty mind or culpable mens
rea.7 1 Denning, explaining the rationale of the theory, stated:
A company may in many ways be likened to a human
body. They have a brain and a nerve [center] which controls what they do. They also have hands which hold the
tools and act in accordance with directions from the
[center]. Some of the people in the company are mere
servants and agents who are nothing more than hands to
do the work and cannot be said to represent the mind or
will. Others are directors and managers who represent
the directing mind and will of the company, and control
what they do. The state of mind of these managers is the
state of mind of the company and is treated by the law as
such.... Whether their intention is the companies intention depends on the nature of the matter under consideration, the relative position of the officer or agent and the
72
other relevant facts and circumstances of the case.
In 1971, the House of Lords acknowledged Lord Denning's rationale in an appeal from the English Court of Appeals, stating that case67. See Queen v. Stevens, 1 L.R. 702; Mousell Bros. v. London and N.W. Rail. Co.,
1916-1917 All E.R. 1101 (K.B. 1917); D.P.P. v. Kent and Sussex Contractors, Ltd., 1 All
E.R. 119 (KB. 1944); R. v. I.C.R. Haulage, Ltd., 1 All E.R. 691 (Crim. App. 1944).
68. R.J. Wickens & C.A. Ong, Confusion Worse Confounded: The End of the Directing
Mind Theory, J. Bus. L. at 532 (Nov. 1997).
69. See R. v. Cory Bros. & Co., 1 KB. 810 (1927).
70.
See generally Wickens & Ong, supra note 68.
71.
H.L. Bolton Co. v. TJ. Graham & Sons, 3 All E.R. 624, 630 (C.A. 1956).
72.
Id.
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law showed companies can be convicted of intent-based crimes: Nevertheless, the court held that a shop assistant was not a directing mind of
a company that owned many supermarkets. 73 Thus, the directing
mind theory seems to represent a middle-ground between strict liabil74
ity and no liability.
Corporations have since been convicted of such crimes as conspiracy to defraud, 75 aiding and abetting regulatory offenses,7876 contempt
of court, 77 and, for the first time in 1994, manslaughter.
III.

TRENDS OF CORPORATE LIABILITY AND THE INADEQUACY OF THE
CORPORATE HOMICIDE BILL
Recent events have spawned public interest in creating a new the-

ory to hold corporations liable for crimes. 79

In 1987, the Herald of

Free Enterprise, a ferry with more than 500 people aboard, departed
the Belgian port of Zeebrugge for England with its bow doors open. 80

It subsequently took on water and capsized killing 188 people.8 ' The
United Kingdom's Director of Public Prosecutions initiated involuntary manslaughter charges against the company P & 0

European En-

terprises and some of its agents, including the assistant bosun who fell
asleep and neglected his duty to close the bow doors.8 2" Justice Turner
73. Tesco Supermarkets v. Natrass, 2 All. E.R. 127 (H.L. 1971). Tesco was convicted of a breach of the Trade Descriptions Act for displaying misleading prices and
appealed to the House of Lords, who reversed the conviction.
74. Id. For a detailed account of the Tesco case and cases decided in that time
period relating to the directing mind theory, see Wickens & Ong, supra note 68, at 525545.
75. See I.C.R. Haulage, 1 All E.R. 691 (Crim. App. 1944).
76. See Accrete's Air Travel Ltd. v. D.P.P., 1 All E.R. 933 (1950); John Henshall
Quarries Ltd. v. Harvey, 2 Q.B. 233 (1965).
77. See R. v. Odham's Press 3 W.L.R. 796 (1956).
78. Gary Slapper, PLC, Wat Is Your Plea?, TIMES, Dec. 13, 1994 (reporting on R. v.
O.L.L. Ltd., an unreported case decided in the Crown Court five days earlier). Four
school friends were killed when their canoes capsized in Lyme Bay on a trip the defendants organized. The defendants were aware that they employed inadequate safety precautions; the managing director failed to warn the harbor authorities, did not employ
competent instructors, and did not use flares or look-outs. His wrongs were imputed to
the company through the directing mind theory. However, the company was small, and
the managing director was a major stockholder who basically controlled the corporation by himself. See LEIGH, supra note 48, at 43-73 (comprehensive discussion of the
other cases in which, and other crimes for which, corporations have been held liable).
79. See LEIGH, supra note 48.
80.
See McCrane & Gault, supra note 5, at 169.
81.
Id.
82.
Id.
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held that the evidence was insufficient to show that the defendants
should have perceived the risks of open-door sailing. 83 He stated that
P & 0 should be acquitted because most of its agents could not be
84
convicted.
In 1988, 35 people died when three rush hour trains collided after
a signaling breakdown. 8 5 The Director of Public Prosecutions decided
not to bring manslaughter charges against British Rail or its technicians due to insufficient evidence.8 6 In 1989, 95 football fans died due
to possible mishandling of the crowd by Yorkshire Police; however, the
Director of Public Prosecutions again decided to forego bringing criminal charges. 8 7 More recently, the Crown Prosecution Service, after another train crash, stated it would not prosecute Railtrack or its
managers for the Paddington crash in 1999, despite the company's history of corporate failings. 88
Prior to the Paddington crash, Lord Hoffman indicated that a
more flexible approach was necessary to successfully convict the corporate entity, because the directing mind theory was apparently not useful for manslaughter cases. 89 Following Hoffman's suggestion, in 1996
the Law Commission proposed a new theory designed to create corporate criminal liability for management failure that results in harm. 90
Unlike the vicarious or directing mind theories, the management
failure theory looks to corporate systems, practices, and policies, rather
than individual actions.9 1 Management failure occurs when corporate
conduct falls far below what is reasonably expected of the corporation
in the circumstances, 92 and when the way in which its activities are
managed or organized fails to ensure the health and safety of persons
employed in or affected by those activities. 9 3 The management failure
theory has not changed since its inception in 1996; 9 4 the Blair adminis83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
E.R. 918
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See generally P & 0 European Fenies, 93 Cr. Ap. R. 72.
Id. at 88.
See McCrane & Gault, supra note 5, at 170.
Id.
Id. at 170-71.
See Webster, supra note 5.
Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd. v. Securities Commission, 3 All
(P.C. 1995).
Wells, supra note 30.
Id. at 548.
Corporate Homicide Act, supra note 6, at §§1(1)(b), 2(1)(b).
Id. at §§1(2)(a), 2(2)(a).
Compare Wells, supra note 30, at 549, with Corporate Homicide Act, supra note

2003]

CORPORATIONS DONT KILL PEOPLE - PEOPLE DO

tration presented the management failure theory to the House of
Commons as the Corporate Homicide Bill in April 2000. 9 5
Although §1 of the Corporate Homicide Bill applies to the corporate entity and permits courts to issue fines, 96 the Health and Safety at
Work Act of 1974 ("HSWA") already has punishment mechanisms in
place to fine the corporate entity for violating the HSWA. 9 7 Further,
the Corporate Homicide Bill would preempt prosecution under the
HSWA, rendering its appropriate provisions meaningless. 98
Corporate fines do not work to successfully deter corporate-related harm. First, since the enactment of the HSWA there has been a
substantial number of deaths related to corporate management failure. 99 The fines provided for in the HSWA have not deterred corporate-related harms; in fact, corporate-related deaths have grown in
number since corporate fining was codified.1 00
See generally Corporate Homicide Act.
Id. at §1.
97. When Great Western Trains pled guilty to violating HSWA §3(1) for the
Southhall train crash, it received a £1,500,000 fine. Attorney-General's Reference (No.
2 of 1999), 2000 Q.B. 796 (Eng. C.A.); Case Comment, CausingPolluting Matter to Enter
Controlled Waters - Offence of Strict Liability, JOURNAL OF PLANNING & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
U.P.L.] 943, 953 (Sept. 2000).
98. Corporate Homicide Act, supra note 6, at §§ 3(7),(8)(a). Section 3, in relevant part, reads as follows:
Remedial Orders Against Convicted Corporation or Officer
3. (1) A court before which a corporation or officer is convicted of corporate killing may, subject to subsection (2) below, order the corporation or officer to take such steps, within such time, as the order
specifies for remedying the failure in question and any matter
which appears to the court to have resulted from the failure and
been the cause or one of the causes of the death.
95.
96.

(7) Where an order is made against a corporation under this section it
shall not be liable under any of the provisions mentioned in subsection (8) below by reason of anything which the order requires it to
remedy in so far as it continues during the time specified by the
order or any further time allowed under subsection (4) above.
(8) The provisions referred to in subsection (7) are-

99.
100.

(b) the provisions of Part I of the Health and Safety at Work etc.
Act 1974...
See Eaglesham, supra note 5.
See generally Fisse & Braithwaite, supra note 29.
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Second, corporations have built-in mechanisms that allow them to
treat fines, in reasonable amounts, as a cost of doing business. 10 1 A
corporation may simply withhold shareholder dividend payments and
use the money it would have distributed to pay its fines. 10 2 Furthermore, the Corporate Homicide Bill states that a court may issue additional fines if a corporation is a repeat offender who does not comply
with a court order to remedy the management failure. 10 3 Excessive
fining, however, merely redirects pain and suffering back onto the
public. Large fines, while likely to trigger internal disciplinary measures within the corporation, are also likely to reduce corporate solvency, lead to layoffs, plant closings, or bankruptcy, and injure
stockholders or creditors. 10 4 Such adverse consequences can often be
more harmful than the corporate crime itself, particularly when the
consequences affect a narrow class of people and the injury the corpo10 5
ration caused is widely diffused.
Third, stigmatizing a corporate entity is likely to further harm the
community in which the corporation operates.1 0 6 A criminal reputa0 7
tion will reduce a corporation's popularity within its community.1
Thus, any benefit it produces for its community would likely be injeopardy, because a criminal reputation can adversely affect business to deprive the community of that benefit.' 0 8 This, as a matter of public
policy, could decrease shareholder incentive to discipline managers,
because shareholders would fear that such discipline could prompt a
corporate conviction, that would cause stigmatization and decrease the
101.
Id. at 41-2; Davis J. Reilly, Murder Inc.: The Criminal Liability of Corporationsfor
Homicide, 18 S.H. L. REv. 378, 401 (1988) (citing Maakestad, State v. Ford Motor Co.:
Constitutional, Utilitarian, and Moral Perspectives, 27 ST. Louis UNIv. L.J. 857, 879-80
(1983)).
102.
See generally EISENBERG, supra note 2.
Corporate Homicide Act 2000, §3(5) (Eng.). Section 3, in relevant part, reads
103.
as follows:
(5) A corporation which fails to comply with an order under this section is guilty of an
offense and liable(a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine ...
104. John C. Coffee Jr., "No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick:" An Unscandalized Look
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386, 408 (1981).
105.
106.

Id.
Arkin, supra note 3, at 28; Reilly, supra note 101, at 403.

107.

Id.

108.

Id.
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value of the entire corporation due to the misconduct of one or a few
individuals.1 09
Additionally, by spreading the punishment across a wide body, the
Corporate Homicide Bill does not advance society toward its goal to
decrease homicide, because doing so diminishes the punishment's deterrent effect. Deterrence only works when individual punishment is
involved; specific deterrence is premised on an individual's incarceration and his or her reflection upon it, and general deterrence is premised on potential criminals reflecting on a convict's incarceration. 10
Thus, the House of Commons should reform the Corporate Homicide
Bill to more adequately deter corporate-related homicide and prevent
the harmful consequences which would follow if it were enacted as it is
written.
IV.

INDIVIDUAL PUNISHMENT OF CORPORATE FUNCTIONARIES
ASSOCIATED WITH THE HOMICIDE

A more effective way to deter corporate-related homicide without
incurring the adverse externalities that accompany corporate fining is
to imprison corporate functionaries associated with the homicide. I II
Individual punishment satisfies the aspirations of criminal justice more
effectively than corporate fines because it instills a more concrete fear
in employees to work responsibly: 1 2 The fear of going to jail is much
more substantial than the fear of taking a pay cut or losing a job.
Thus, individual punishment is more likely to deter the actions, omissions, or management failures that result in death.
Further, individual punishment, unlike the corporate fine, would
not adversely affect the public in any way. 113 There is much less stigma
placed on the corporation because only those individuals responsible
for the homicide are labeled "criminals."'1 14 The corporation can
continue to supply the benefit it produces for the community unfettered by a criminal reputation or dislike within the community.1 5 Additionally, the corporation would not harm innocent people by
withholding dividend payments, making financial cutbacks, or laying
109.
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off employees to satisfy the punishment, as it would do to satisfy a
16
fine.'
Corporations and the public would benefit from individual punishment because the corporations would shed their irresponsible employees (as they would be incarcerated) and collectively act more
responsibly with respect to public safety.1 17 Thus, the House of Commons should remove §1 of the Corporate Homicide Bill, which aims to
deter corporate-related homicide by punishing the corporate entity
with fines.
The Corporate Homicide Bill contains a well-intentioned provision designed to punish individuals for corporate-related homicide;" 8
however, it is not without faults. The Corporate Homicide Bill limits
individual liability for homicide to an officer,1 9 which it defines very
narrowly as "the chairman, managing director, chief executive, or sec20
retary of a corporation."
The Corporate Homicide Bill, while realistically foreseeing that
most important business decisions are made by high executive officers, 12 1 does not hold liable for homicide other corporate functionaries who may be closely associated with a death. 1 22 Plant supervisors
and shop foremen, often without first checking with the CEO or informing a corporate officer, make important decisions regarding the
safety of their workers on a daily basis: The Corporate Homicide Bill
ignores the fact that a plant foreman or supervisor may have more control over the safety of others than do corporate officers. 12 3 Thus, the
House of Commons should reform the Bill so that it does not limit
liability to officers; it should expand the scope of liability to also include board members, plant supervisors, foremen, and any other corporate functionaries who, in the scope of their employment, are
associated with the homicide.
Although the Corporate Homicide Bill does not prevent prosecution for manslaughter or murder in a traditional sense, 124 a court may
116.
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be more likely to convict for corporate homicide with respect to corporate related deaths because there is a lesser degree of punishment to
coincide with an arguably lesser degree of culpability. Since the acts
that caused these deaths have generally gone unpunished for the past
decade,125 it is important that the Corporate Homicide Bill becomes a
part of the United Kingdom's criminal laws.
From a public policy perspective, however, the Corporate Homicide Bill's enactment may cause a further decrease in the number of
charges brought against individuals for traditional murder or manslaughter. The Director of Public Prosecutions may rely on the management failure theory to punish the corporate entity instead of
prosecuting individuals for murder and manslaughter. In other words,
individuals responsible for the death may "get away with murder" because prosecutors would focus more on the corporate crime, thereby
abandoning any attempt to prosecute the individual.
V.

CONCLUSION

While society may desire to avenge the deaths of many people and
deter future deaths, it must not do so in a manner that continues to
harm it further. A corporate fine has this effect, but individual punishment does not.1 26 Additionally, a collective corporate fine does not
adequately serve the aspirations of deterrence as ajustification for punishment; deterrence is only effective when people are punished
individually.
Further, the House of Commons should reform the Corporate
Homicide Bill to apply to individuals only. While all crimes, except
1 27
those of strict liability, involve an act and a culpable mental state,
"[a] corporation is an abstraction. It is incapable itself of doing any
1 28
physical act or being in any state of mind."
Vincent Todarello
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